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Among the many controversies aroused by Professor Richard Epstein's book, Forbidden Grounds, is a dispute over his assertion that
the economic subjugation of black Americans between Reconstruction and the modern civil rights era was a result of a combination of
Jim Crow laws, actual or threatened private violence, and laws that
gave monopoly power to private actors who discriminated against
blacks, rather than irrational private discrimination and social custom in a free marketplace.' Epstein argues that blacks would have
been far better off economically under a laissez-faire system of free
labor markets and equal protection of the law.' Critics, however,
have taken him to task for not providing sufficient historical evidence
to support his position.'
Of course a historical counterfactual cannot be proven, so we cannot be certain how blacks would have fared in a marketplace free
from governmental discrimination and private violence. The legacy
of government policy, though, has surely been underestimated as a
factor in the plight of black Americans. For example, as shall be
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demonstrated below, white interest groups used occupational licensing laws to stifle black economic progress. While generally not Jim
Crow laws per se, the laws were used both in the South and the
North to prevent blacks from competing with established white
skilled workers.
I.

LICENSING LAWS, PEOPLE OF COLOR, AND THE COURTS

The first thing that should be noted about licensing laws is that
even if their supporters had the best of intentions, and had no hostility to blacks, the laws would have hurt blacks nonetheless. Because
unions did not admit blacks into their apprenticeship training programs and because southern public schools provided blacks with very
little vocational training as compared to whites, 4 skilled black workers generally had little formal training in their professions and therefore often could not satisfy certain licensing requirements despite
their practical experience. Moreover, because of discrimination,
blacks usually had little formal education, making the typical licensing exam comprised of written sections an insurmountable hurdle to
many blacks. Therefore, even purely public-spirited licensing laws, if
such things actually existed, necessarily harmed blacks.
The pursuit of the public interest, however, was seldom the sole
motivation behind the passage of licensing statutes. States and municipalities frequently passed licensing laws at the behest of the organized members of the licensed profession in order to grant them a
state-sponsored monopoly at the expense of those who could not get
the license. Even in cases of "hostile" licensing, when the licensing
process was originated to regulate an industry in the public interest,
generally the licensed group quickly gained control of the licensing
process and used it to benefit its members by limiting the number of
new entrants, thus assuring those already in the field of higher
incomes. 5
Organized groups of workers controlled the licensing process
through their unions or professional societies. Those groups usually
excluded blacks, and they used the licensing statutes to prevent
blacks from gaining licenses in professions in which they were once
numerous - particularly, though far from exclusively, in the South
and to prevent blacks from getting a toehold in other fields.6
4. HERBERT R. NORTHRUP. ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO 38 (1944).
5. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing
1890-1910: A Legal and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REv. 487, 496-97 n.41 (1965).
6. Richard B. Freeman, The Effect of Occupational Licensing on Black Occupational Attainment, in OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING AND REGULATION (Simon Rottenberg
ed., 1980); Herbert Hill, Black Labor and Affirmative Action: An HistoricalPerspective,
in THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION 190, 213 (William Darity, Jr. & Steven Shulman
eds., 1989) [hereinafter Affirmative Action]; cf. LORENZO GREENE & CARTER 0.
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Occasionally, states or municipalities passed laws explicitly restricting blacks from a profession. A Maryland statute, for example,
restricted admission to the bar to white males.7 Far more often, however, organized white workers used facially neutral laws that had a
plausible public health or welfare justification to keep blacks out of a
field.
Indeed, facially neutral licensing laws have a history of being used
against racial minorities. Yick Wo v. Hopkins,8 one of the first
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and substantive due process
cases to reach the Supreme Court, involved a San Francisco ordinance that made it unlawful to run a laundry business without having first obtained a license from the City Board of Supervisors. As
the case wound its way through the courts, the government asserted
that the ordinance was a prophylactic measure against a potentially
disastrous fire. The city, however, obviously designed the law to
eliminate Chinese laundries that were usually housed in wooden
buildings. The Board of Supervisors also administered the law unevenly; whites who owned wooden laundries were able to acquire the
necessary operating licenses, while the government prosecuted Chinese laundry owners. 9 The Supreme Court struck down the law, noting that it violated economic liberty and arguing: "Though the law
itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand . . .the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.""
Despite its potential power, courts rarely relied upon Yick Wo in
licensing cases. Instead, an 1888 case, Dent v. West Virginia," in
WOODSON . THE NEGRO WAGE EARNER 192 (1969) (blacks in Memphis had trouble
passing plumbers license test as early as 1902).
7. The Maryland Supreme Court upheld the law on the strength of The Slaughter
House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873). In re Taylor, 38 Md. 28 (1877); see David S. Bogen,
The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of
Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L. REV. 939, 943 (1985). The law was invalidated a few years later in an unreported decision. Id. at 1038-39.
8. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
9. The white owners of steam laundries who competed with the Chinese hand laundries provided the motivating force behind the laundry law. See In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471,
474 (C.C.D. Cal.), afid sub nom. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). An analogous situation occurred in Georgia in the 1920s, when white owners of steam laundries persuaded
the City of Atlanta to pass an ordinance requiring black washwomen to obtain a certificate that their premises were disease free. The black community understood the ordinance to have discriminatory origins. Edward A. Gaston, A History of the Negro Wage
Earner In Georgia 292-93 (1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University).
10. GASTON, supra note 9, at 373-74.
11. 129 U.S. 114 (1888).

which the Court upheld the licensing of physicians on public health
grounds, became the most important licensing precedent. The Supreme Court had subsequent opportunities to rule on the question of
the licensing of physicians, and invariably sustained the licensing
laws.12 On the strength of those cases, lower courts universally accepted the general proposition that licensing statutes were
constitutional.13
Nonetheless, it was not inevitable that the Dent holding would establish the rule governing licensing challenges. In 1897, the Supreme
Court explicitly embraced liberty of contract in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, emphasizing the right of a person "to earn his living by any
lawful calling." 14 The most famous liberty of contract case, Lochner v. New York,1 5 also gave hope to anti-licensing forces. Not only
did the decision generally stand for liberty of contract, but the majority in Lochner also specifically referred to the dangers of occupational licensing. Justice Peckham, writing for the Court, warned that
"interference on the part of the legislatures of the several states with
16
the ordinary trades and occupations seems to be on the increase.1
Peckham approvingly cited decisions in which state courts
invali17
dated licensing regulations on the trade of shoeing horses.
Yet Lochner, like Yick Wo and Allgeyer before it, had little impact on most state court licensing decisions. As long as the government was able to cite a plausible public health purpose for a
licensing statute, it was almost always upheld. This judicial deference allowed racially exclusionary white unions and professional organizations to monopolize certain professions. 18 The rest of this
Article will explore three examples of occupations from which blacks
were restricted through the application of facially-neutral licensing
laws - medicine, plumbing, and barbering.
12. Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505
(1903); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); see also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S.
165 (1923) (upholding licensing of dentists).
13. RICHARD REAVES, THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION
1 (1984); Friedman, supra note 5, at 511. Dent was cited as late as 1964 in Smith v.
State of California, 336 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1964), in a case upholding the licensing of
engineers. The court relied on Dent, noting that while Dent applied to medicine, "[t]he
principles stated in the Dent case have been widely applied by all of the states in a great
variety of professions and businesses." Id. at 534.
14. 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
15. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. Id. at 60.
17. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63, citing Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 334, 62 N.E. 215
(1901); People v. Beattie, 96 A.D. 383, 89 N.Y.S. 193 (1904); In re Aubry, 36
Wash. 308, 78 P. 900 (1904).
18. License fees were also used against striking black workers at least one time. W.
HARRIS, THE HARDER WE RUN: BLACK WORKERS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR 37 (1982)
(introduction of a $25 license fee requirement broke the strike of Atlanta laundresses in
1881).

Licensing Laws

[VOL. 31: 89. 1994]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A.

Physician Licensing Laws

The physician licensing laws are a clear example of laws initially
passed for a public purpose that wound up hurting blacks unintentionally. The impact of the growth of licensing laws on the number
of black physicians was not severe, at first. For example, despite the
spread of licensing laws, between 1900 and 1910 the percentage of
black physicians in the United States rose from 1.3 % to 2%.19
In 1910, Abraham Flexner published his famous study of medical
education in the U.S., known as the Flexner Report. Flexner's study
showed that many American medical schools provided severely inadequate education and many doctors were, therefore, incompetent to
practice medicine. In response, some states put medical licensure directly in the hands of the American Medical Association (AMA).20
Other states required that potential doctors be graduates of a medical school rated "A" or "B" by the AMA.21
Once the AMA took control of the licensing procedure, state physician licensing laws began to have marked effects on the number of
black doctors. Most important, they forced five of the seven existing
black medical schools - those that educated most black doctors to close.22 These schools received "C" or lower ratings from the
AMA despite desperate attempts by their administrators to raise
their standards. 3
With the black community in dire need of physicians, one would
have imagined that public-spirited licensing officials would have temporarily bent standards to allow the black schools to catch up. Alternatively, they could have pressured the other medical schools to
admit black students. The AMA, though, was concerned mainly
19. Reuben A. Kessel, The A.M.A. and the Supply of Physicians, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 270 (1970).
20. FRANCIS DELANCY, THE LICENSING OF PROFESSIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA 111-12
& n.76 (1938).
21. HERBERT

WALL, OCCUPATIONAL RESTRICTIONS: A STUDY OF THE LAWS OF
EIGHTEEN SELECTED STATES, COVERING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTERING OCCUPATIONS THEREIN 30 (1929).

22. Kessel, supra note 19, at 270. As late as the 1940s approximately 80% of
black doctors were receiving their education at the two black medical schools, Howard
and Meharry. GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 32, 419 (1943). For a history
of how the Flexner Report led to the closure of certain medical schools for blacks, see
Todd L. Savitt, The Education of Black Physicians at Shaw University, 1882-1918, in
BLACK AMERICANS IN NORTH CAROLINA AND THE SOUTH 160, 181-85 (Jeffrey J. Crow
& Flora J. Hatley eds., 1984). Savitt's article also provides statistics showing the negative effect that state licensing laws had on black medical schools and students. Id. at 18283.
23. Savitt, supra note 22.

with the interests of its members, who were, by strict rule, all
white.24 Not surprisingly, after 1910 the percentage of black doctors,
which had been rising, leveled off.25 The discriminatory effects of
facially-neutral physician licensing statutes helped create a shortage
of medical personnel to serve the black community that continues to
this day.
B. Plumber Licensing Laws
Valid public health rationales for states and municipalities to regulate plumbers existed. Defective and improperly installed plumbing
fixtures were responsible for dysentery epidemics in Chicago in 1933
and in Kansas in 1942.26 But licensing statutes allegedly promulgated for public health reasons are susceptible to being used primarily as barriers to entry.27 Yet, for the most part, courts refused to
examine the motives behind the statutes or how they were implemented. As a practical matter, courts allowed the interests of black
plumbers to suffer without any gain to the public health.
Licensing statutes for plumbers generally delegated the power to
license individuals as plumbers to a licensing board composed of
members appointed by the mayor and/or city council. Not surprisingly, local plumbers' unions, representing the politically best-organized plumbers, were able to exert a great deal of influence over who
was chosen to serve on the board of examiners. The Plumbers' and
Steamfitters' Union, affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL), excluded blacks nationally throughout the Lochner era.28
Through their influence on boards of examiners, the unions were
often able to deny licenses to their black competitors.29
24. DELANCY, supra note 20, at 111-15; see generally JAME.S G. BURROW, ORGANIZED MEDICINE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: THE MOVE TOWARD MONOPOLY (1977).

25. MYRDAL, supra note 22, at 319 Table 3; Kessel, supra note 19, at 270. Discrimination in medicine due to licensing was also extremely harmful to Jews. See Reuben
Kessel, Price Discrimination in Medicine, 1 J.L. & ECON. 20, 47 n.82 (1958); see also
Thomas Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93 (1961) (citizenship requirements were added to licensing laws to keep out Jewish immigrants).
26. Note, Restriction of Freedom of Entry into the Building Trades, 38 IOWA L.
REV. 556, 557 (1953).
27. Cf. WALTER GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT RESTRAINTS 114-15 (1968); Friedman, supra note 5, at 497 n.41.
28. PHILIP FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1900-1909 240
(1964) (exclusion of plumbers around turn of the century); DEP'T OF RESEARCH AND
INVESTIGATIONS, NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, NEGRO MEMBERSHIP IN AMERICAN LABOR UN-

IONS 38 (1930); STERLING SPERO & ABRAM HARRIS, THE BLACK WORIKER 58 (1931)

(blacks excluded from plumbers' uniofi by tacit agreement); Charles S. Johnson, Negro
Workers and the Unions, THE SURVEY, Apr. 15, 1928, at 113 (as of 1928, out of 35,000
members of Plumbers' and Steam Fitters' Union none were black, despite 3,600 Negro
workers in the trade as of 1928).
29. As Spero and Harris noted in their 1931 study of black workers: "It is generally understood that Negroes are not admitted to the Plumbers' and Steamfitters' Union.

[VOL. 31: 89. 1994]

Licensing Laws
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Despite liberty-of-contract arguments made by unlicensed plumbers, state courts almost uniformly upheld the power of the state to
license plumbers on public health grounds and rarely looked closely
at how licensing was being administered. The judges of the day, infused with Progressive optimism about the benevolence of government and the value of institutionalized expertise, seem to have had
little or no awareness of the misuses to which licensing laws could so
easily be put. In 1898, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld a plumbers licensing law, noting that it did not "anticipate
that any examining board would go further than the act requires,
and insist upon more than this practical knowledge acquired in the
school of experience." 30 The Wisconsin court apparently believed
that the licensing authorities' only interest would be to protect the
public health from incompetent plumbers.
Yet by the time the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Winkler, a
case had been published in which a party alleged that a licensing
board was using discriminatory criteria in making its decisions. In an
1895 New York State case, People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden,3 1

Peter Nechamcus, a master plumber, complained that he was unable
to get a plumber's license because of his religion and his Russian
nationality. 32 His brief gave examples of other applicants who had
been refused certificates because of their "race and religion" and because they did not belong "to an association of master plumbers. 33
In other words, Nechamcus argued that the licensing board discriminated against Jews, immigrants, and those who did not belong to a
union. He argued that the law was unconstitutional because it created a monopoly and was applied discriminatorily.
One of the plans for disqualifying them is the license law. It requires that every person
wishing to practice the plumbing trade pass an examination given under municipal authority." SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 28, at 59; see also RAYFORD LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO 155 (1965); NORTHRUP, supra note 4, at 223-24.
Examining boards would require a union apprenticeship before a potential licensee
could even qualify to take the licensing examination. Because blacks were banned from
union apprenticeship programs, they could not even qualify to take the test. Herman D.
Bloch, Craft Unions and the Negro in HistoricalPerspective, 43 J. NEGRO HIST. 10, 23
(1958). Other tactics favored by unions in preventing blacks from getting licenses were
requiring a high school diploma and/or requiring a highly subjective personal interview
before one could take the exam. WALTER E. WILLIAMS, THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS 9495 (1982). If those tactics did not work, the examining boards were not above doctoring
test scores. Id.
30. State ex rel. Winkler v. Benzenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 177, 76 N.W. 345, 346

(1898).

31. 144 N.Y. 529, 39 N.E. 686 (1895).
32. Id. at 534, 39 N.E. at 687.
33. Id.

The court rejected Nechamcus' argument that the law created a
despite Yick Wo - that it would not
strike down licensing laws even if they were applied in a discriminatory manner:
monopoly,34 and added -

Nor is the constitutionality of an act to be determined by the manner in
which its provisions may be carried out by those upon whom devolves the
duty of acting as examiners. If they act unfairly or oppressively, as alleged
by the relator in his petition, that is conduct which may call for a remedy
against the persons who compose the board; but it does not furnish ground
for assailing the validity of the statute.35

The Nechamcus decision led to the exclusion of blacks from plumbing in New York City through union control of licensing, 3 and became an important precedent upholding exclusionary licensing in
other states.
Throughout the late 1890s and early 1900s, state courts continued
to uphold the licensing of plumbers on public health grounds. 37 In
one of the most important and widely cited licensing cases, the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld the general authority of the state to license
plumbers. 8 The court, rejecting a challenge based on Yick Wo, cited
Dent and Nechamcus as precedents.39
In the aftermath of this decision, Ohio plumbers' licensing laws,
though outwardly passed in order to improve sanitary standards, actually gave control of the field to the racially exclusive plumbers'
union. 40 The union promptly used the laws to exclude their competition, including black plumbers. 4 ' As a result, by 1910 only five
blacks were licensed as plumbers in the entire city of Cleveland, despite the fact42 that blacks had once been prominent in the skilled
trades there.
None of the plumbers cases discussed above involved black plumbers directly. Nevertheless, the reluctance of the courts to carefully
review the substance and application of licensing laws encouraged
racist plumbers' unions to boldly push for licensing laws specifically
in order to keep blacks out of the profession. A Virginia plumber
wrote the following letter, published in the Plumbers' Journal, discussing his union's lobbying for a state licensing law that would
serve to exclude blacks:
[T]he Negro is a factor in this section, and I believe the enclosed Virginia
34. Id. at 539, 39 N.E. at 689.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
22 (1977).
See, e.g., Singer v. Maryland, 72 Md. 464, 19 A. 1044 (Md. App., 1890).
HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM

38. State v. Gardner, 58 Ohio St. 599, 51 N.E. 136 (1898).
39. Id. at 609, 51 N.E. at 138.
40. DAVID A. GERBER. BLACK OHIO AND THE COLOR LINE, 1860-1915 303 (1976).
41.

Id.

42. Id.; Hill, supra note 6, at 214.
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state plumbing law will entirely eliminate him and the impostor from following our craft and I would suggest to the different locals that if they
be able to secure just as
would devote a little time and money they 4would
3
good if not a better law in their own state.

Despite the discriminatory intent, the bill made no mention of race
whatsoever. Rather, the bill provided, among other things, that

members from the local plumbers' union should be included on the
board of examiners that passes upon the competency of applicants. It

was patterned after a similar Kansas statute which was typical of
the plumbers' license laws found in twenty-four states and Puerto

Rico as of 1924. 44

As the years passed, the courts continued to ignore the abuse of

plumbers' licensing laws. Blacks made significant inroads into the
plumbing trade in Philadelphia and Chicago until licensing laws
were used to exclude them.4 5 After such laws were passed, however,
blacks could no longer obtain plumbing licenses. 46 Yet the courts

proceeded to uphold the laws.41

A few state courts did, however, recognize the danger of allowing

licensing boards to control entry into the plumbing profession. The
Arkansas Supreme Court, in striking down its state's law, declared
its suspicion that the law would be misused: "The constitutionality of
the act must be tested, not by what the board has actually done, but
by the power it actually has. The presumption that public servants

indulged in determining whether the act
will do their duty cannot be
' 48
violates the Constitution.

These occasional decisions, though, did not stem the overall tide of
licensing laws being upheld by state courts. The results of judicial
43. Letter from C. H. Perry to the Plumbers' J., 16 (Feb. 1905), quoted in SPERO
& HARRIS, supra note 28, at 478; see also PLUMBERS, GAS AND STEAM FITTERS OFFICIAL
JOURNAL, Jan. 1905, at 10, quoted in SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 28, at 481: "There
are about ten Negro skate plumbers working around here [Danville, Va.] doing quite a
lot of jobbing and repairing, but owing to the fact of not having an examining board it is
impossible to stop them, hence the anxiety of the men here to organize."
44. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 28, at 59.
45. Id. at 160 Table X.
46. HILL, supra note 36, at 22; NATIONAL INTERRACIAL CONGRESS, TOWARD INTERRACIAL COOPERATION 123 (1926); SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 28, at 479-80.
47. Douglas v. People ex rel. Ruddy, 225 Ill. 536, 80 N.E. 341 (1907); Rock v.
City of Philadelphia, 127 Pa. Super. 143, 191 A. 669 (Super. Ct. 1937), afl'd, 328 Pa.
382, 196 A. 59 (1938).
48. Replogle v. City of Little Rock, 166 Ark. 617, 628, 267 S.W. 353, 356 (1924);
see also Dewell v. Quarles, 180 Ga. 864, 181 S.E. 159 (1935). Note the contrast between
Replogle and Nechamcus. In the former case, the court held that the mere potential for
abuse was enough to render a law invalid. In Nechamcus, however, the court held that
even evidence of abuse is not sufficient to invalidate a law.

acquiescence to the licensing system, combined with other factors
benefiting the plumbers' union, particularly inspection laws,'49 discriminatory government funding of vocational training, 0 and local
government's inability or unwillingness to curb union
violence
52
against black competitors, 51 were disastrous for blacks.
The exact effect of licensing laws on black plumbers is difficult to
quantify because most surveys of black occupational status underestimate the effect of licensing by relying on self-reported census occupational data. Such data are skewed because many black plumbers
-

including Justice Clarence Thomas' grandfather 3

-

have tradi-

tionally been forced to work in the underground economy without
licenses, or to pay whites to "officially" do the plumbing work actually done by blacks. 4
We do know that the efforts of the plumbers' unions to keep
blacks from getting licenses were extraordinarily successful. To take
a few examples, a 1953 state investigation disclosed that out of 3,200
licensed plumbers in Maryland, only two were black.5 5 The first
black passed a plumbers' licensing exam in Colorado in 1950 - and
only after pressure from civil rights authorities.5 Only one black
plumber was licensed in Charlotte, North Carolina in 1968. 7 As late
as 1972, only one black plumber was licensed in all of Montgomery
49. White inspectors, recruited from the plumbers' union, refused to approve work
done by blacks. NORTHRUP, supra note 4, at 24. Such laws were routinely upheld once
licensing itself was upheld. See, e.g., City of New Castle v. Withers, 291 Pa. 216, 139 A.
860 (1927).
50. ROBERT C. WEAVER, NEGRO LABOR: A NATIONAL PROBLEM 42-43 (1947); see
also RAY MARSHALL, The Negro in Southern Unions, in THE NEGRO AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 128, 135 (Julius Jacobson ed., 1968).
51. To take just one example, the Urban League reported the case of a black
plumber who unsuccessfully tried to join the Journeyman Plumbers' Union for several
years. His work was bombed several times. NAT'L URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 28, at
134.
52. See FLORENCE PETERSON, AMERICAN LABOR UNIONS 88-89 (1945); MARSHALL, supra note 50, at 145 (municipal licensing laws, along with apprenticeship restrictions, severely limited black opportunity in plumbing field).
53. PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, Clarence Thomas Interviewed by Bill
Kaufman, in FREE MINDS & FREE MARKETS 142 (Robert W. Poole, Jr., & Virginia I.
Postrel eds., 1993) (quoting an interview with Clarence Thomas in Washington, D.C. in

1987).
54. The white plumbers did not interfere with black plumbers if they only worked

in black neighborhoods or did dirty work that union plumbers did not want. BENJAMIN
SHIMBERG ET AL, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PRACTICES AND POLICIES 116 (1973);
MARSHALL,

supra note 50, at 145.

55. SHIMBERG ET AL, supra note 54, at 116. Licensing of plumbers was upheld in
Maryland in Singer v. Maryland State, 72 Md. 464, 19 A. 1044 (1890).
56. Plumbers' licensing laws in Colorado were upheld in Evans v. City of Denver,

79 Colo. 533, 247 P. 173 (1926) (upholding conviction of helpers and apprentices for

acting as journeymen without a license).
57. Zachary Dyckman, An Analysis of Negro Employment in the Building Trades
73 (1971) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, available at Yale University

Sterling Memorial Library).

Licensing Laws

[VOL. 31: 89. 1994]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

County, Alabama, and he was only able to get his license after a
ferocious struggle with the local plumbers' union.5 8 By the early
1970s, very few black plumbers were licensed in the United States. 59
C. Barber Licensing Laws
In the late 19th century, southern blacks had a near monopoly on
the barber profession. 0 Many northern blacks worked as barbers as
well. Overall, in 1890 20.5% of the barbers and hairdressers in the
United States were black. 1 However, because of an increase in immigrant barbers, as well as other factors, many whites started to patronize only white barbers.6 2 By 1910, only about 11 % of American
barbers, beauticians, and manicurists were black.6 3 Encouraged by
this decline, white barbers soon aspired to use the legal system to
totally limit black barbers to black customers.
White barbers were sometimes less than subtle in their attempts to
monopolize white customers. In 1926, the Atlanta City Council
passed an ordinance requiring barbers to only serve members of their
own race.6 4 Unlike many facially neutral laws that served intentionally or unintentionally to advantage white workers at the expense of
blacks, this law caused an uproar among both blacks and sympathetic whites.6 5 The City modified the ordinance to prohibit black
barbers from serving white women or children under fourteen years
old and to require them to close their shops at seven every night. 6
The Chamber of Commerce, however, fearful of bad publicity for
the city and of further restrictions on black workers which might
hurt its members, provided lawyers to fight the law in the courts.6 7 A
group of independent black barbers, and white barbers who employed blacks, challenged the law.68 The result was that in 1927 the
58. SHIMBERG ET AL, supra note 54, at 112-13.
59. HERBERT R. NORTHRUP, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO xb (1971).
60. HILL, supra note 36, at 15; GASTON, supra note 9, at 270.
61. WILLIAM ScoTr, THE JOURNEYMAN BARBERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
AMERICA, 44 n.27 (1936) (citing ELEVENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES 354-55

(1890)).

62. See, e.g., RICHARD WRIGHT, THE NEGRO IN PENNSYLVANIA: A STUDY IN EC75-76 (1911) (black barbers lost most of their white customers, but
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retained their black customers).
63.
(1910).

Culled from 1910 census data. TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES

64.

GASTON,

65.

Id. at 293-94.

supra note 9, at 293.

66. Id. at 294.
67. Id. at 293-95.
68. Id. at 294.

Georgia Supreme Court struck it down as a violation69 of equal protection, property rights, and substantive due process.
Usually, though, laws that served to restrict black barbers were
facially neutral and seemed to have nothing to do with race at all.
The Norfolk (Va.) Journal and Guide, a black weekly, complained
that such a law, however, had as certainly been designed "to effectively limit the opportunity of colored persons to follow the trades if
it had been openly drafted to accomplish that purpose. ' 7 0 The bill
that the Journal and Guide opposed mandated that licenses would
only be issued to those who had served as registered apprentices for
eighteen months and had passed an examination given by the Board
of Examiners. One could only become a registered apprentice if one
graduated from a school of barbering approved by the Board.
Schools of barbering would be prohibited from accepting applicants
having less than an eighth grade or equivalent education. 1
These facially neutral regulations were, in fact, discriminatory, the
paper editorialized. First of all, the newspaper noted that no existing
barbers' school would admit blacks, and it predicted that the board
would simply refuse to license any new school that did. Moreover,
"prejudice or politics involved with organized labor's voting strength
might easily operate through the board to destroy the usefulness of
Negro barbering schools and, of course, cut off the source of apprentices."12 Also, according to the editors, many blacks in the state
could not meet the eighth grade educational requirements and, even
if they could, many could not afford to spend six months at a barbering college.73 "The proposed barbers' licensing law is a real menace
to the economic opportunity of colored people," the Journal and
Guide warned. "The social consciousness and responsibility of the
State must be aroused against this pernicious measure, masquerading as a public health effort, but obviously an organized labor union
project drawn in the special interest of white organized labor. 1 4
69. Chaires v. Atlanta, 164 Ga. 755, 139 S.E. 559 (1927). Several years earlier,
a Michigan court had struck down a law banning aliens from becoming licensed barbers.
Templar v. Board of Barbers, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 (1902). States of Idaho,
Iowa, and Wisconsin later made citizenship a requirement for licensing. IDAHO CODE
§ 53-606 (1931); IOWA CODE § 2585-613 (1931); WIs. STAT. § 158.08 (1931).

70. The Proposed Barbers Licensing Law,

NORFOLK J. & GUIDE,
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(editorial page). The editors note that the discriminatory aspects of this law "are basically simiar to the provisions employed by organized labor to bar members of the
colored race from many skilled trades." Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The Journeyman Barber's Union did not generally admit blacks. NAT'L
URBAN LEAGUE, supra note 28, at 155. The union's official policy, however, was that it
did admit blacks. ScoTr, supra note 61, at 43-44. Some local chapters of the union,
particularly in the North, apparently did admit blacks, while many did not. Discrimination by the Barbers' union apparently increased between the turn of the century, when
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The proposed Virginia law was supported by the Virginia Federation of Labor and other trade unions, and was vigorously opposed by
the Virginia Commission on Interracial Relations.7 5 Opponents of
the bill argued that the proposed board of three white barbers could
sooner or later eliminate all black barbers on one pretext or other.76
As one commentator noted, if under licensing a certain black barber
shop is taking too much business from its white rivals, "a question or
two [from a board of white barbers] to the operator concerning sebaceous glands and the problem is quickly solved."' 77 Ben Taylor, a
black barber, testified that his colleagues would "whiten the mountains with their bones" and "dye old Virginia with their blood"
rather than
submit to be licensed by a State board of barber
78
examiners.
While the proposed Virginia law went down to defeat,7 9 by 1941
every state except Virginia and New York had barbers' licensing
laws. In those two states, however, local government stepped in to fill
the gap. 80 The laws often had many of the elements objected to by
the Journaland Guide. Indeed, while it seemed obvious to the Journal and Guide that the Virginia bill was purposely aimed to restrict
black barbers, it was actually typical of license laws lobbied for by
unions and passed by many states, including those with few, if any,
black barbers.8 ' Unions successfully designed the laws to prevent the
licensure of the poorest and least-educated barbers and potential
barbers,82 a greatly disproportionate percentage of whom were black,
and union-dominated licensing boards undoubtedly applied facially
neutral licensing standards in a discriminatory fashion, as predicted
by the Journal and Guide.
Blacks were not mute in the face of this threat to their livelihood.
In Ohio, the barbers' union tried to pass licensing legislation that

the union's nondiscriminatory policy was set, and the 1930s. ScoTT, supra note 61. In
1903, 1000 members of the Journeymen Barbers' Union were black, but by 1928 only
239 were black. SPERO & HARRIS, supra note 28, at 76 Table I.
75. Virginius Dabney, Negro Barbers in the South, THE NATION, July 16, 1930, at
64.
76. Id. at 65.

77. Id.
78.
79.
80.
Barbers,
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
David Fellman, A Case Study in Administrative Law 26 WASH. U. L.Q. 213, 214-15 n.1 (1941).
See ScoTT, supra note 61, at 80-84.
Id. at 87.

The Regulation of

blacks believed would effectively drive them out of the trade, although the law was probably not designed for that purpose. Black
barbers and non-union white barbers successfully opposed such bills
in 1902, 1904, 1910, and 1913, but a licensing law finally passed in
1915 after some issues of contention were compromised. 83 Black barbers in West Virginia, meanwhile, managed to convince the state
government to protect their interests through a statutory requirement that one member of the four man examination board be
black. 4
While black barbers and their allies had some success in blocking
licensing in the state legislatures, they often failed. Opponents of licensing then turned to the courts, but only rarely managed to persuade judges that licensing laws violated their right to occupational
liberty. Beginning in about 1900, cases almost uniformly upheld licensing of barbers.8 Even the Washington State Supreme Court,
which declared licensing of plumbers to be unconstitutional the year
before, upheld it for barbers, over a vigorous dissent by Justice
Rudkin, who demonstrated how little the provisions of the law related to public health. 6
Minnesota had passed the first barbers' licensing law in 1897 and
other states quickly followed suit.8 7 As with plumbers, the major effect of licensing of barbers was not necessarily to keep blacks out of
the field, but to prevent their licensure. Ironically, the unionized barbers' racism protected blacks to some extent from the effects of licensing laws. If union members discovered an unlicensed black
barber who continued to serve white customers, the union would
complain to the authorities. White union barbers, though, had no
interest in serving black customers. Legal authorities, therefore, did
not harass unlicensed black barbers as long as they restricted their
trade to black neighborhoods.
Barbers' licensing laws continue to have a negative effect on
blacks. As late as the early 1980s researchers reported that unlicensed black barbers and beauticians commonly practiced their
trade in the inner city because of difficulty in getting licensed,"8
thereby saving their careers, but sacrificing their level of income. 89

83. GERBER, supra note 40, at 335-36 & n.44.
84. W. VA. CODE § 1409(41) (1936).
85. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 518; see Annotation, Constitutionalityof Statute
Regulating Barbers, 20 A.L.R. 1111; Annotation, Validity of Statute or OrdinanceRegulating Barbers, 98 A.L.R. 1088; see Fellman, supra note 80.
86. State v. Walker, 48 Wash. 8, 92 P. 775, 778 (1907).
87. ScoTT, supra note 61, at 79.
88. Stuart Dorsey, Occupational Licensing and Minorities, 7 L. & HUMAN
BEHAV.

89.

171, 177, 179 (1983).
Id. at 177.
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Interestingly, the reasons blacks have trouble getting barbers' licenses today are remarkably similar to some of the problems the
Journal and Guide foresaw from the proposed Virginia law: blacks
often cannot afford trade school tuition (where students are taught
how to pass the exams) and have generally inferior educational
opportunity 0
One relatively recent study of cosmetology licensing found that
while the failure rates of blacks and whites on the practical part of
the examination were about even, blacks failed the written portion of
the examination at a much higher rate than whites. Qtialified black
beauticians were unable to get licensed because they could not answer questions that were only tangentially related to their jobs. 91 Besides those who failed the test, one must consider the many others
who are discouraged from taking it because they do not believe they
can pass. The situation surely was far worse in the days when the
tests were often intentionally used to exclude blacks.
CONCLUSION

The licensing laws discussed above are merely the tip of the iceberg. Not only have other licensing laws also served to exclude
blacks from the skilled trades, but a variety of other economic regulations have contributed to the economic plight of blacks. For example, as I have argued elsewhere, 92 Depression era labor legislation
contributed greatly to the rise of the black underclass. Further research would undoubtedly uncover other examples.
Too many legal scholars and historians ignore this sorry history of
government intervention into the labor market when focusing on civil
rights issues, because they focus solely on private discriminatory behavior instead. Regardless of what one thinks of Professor Epstein's
overall thesis, it should be recognized that he has done the legal
community a great service by reminding it that the source of some of
the economic disparity between whites and blacks is past government
provision of de jure monopoly power to white dominated interest
groups. While that is obviously only part of the story, the example of
90.

91.

Id. at 173.

Stuart Dorsey, The Occupational Licensing Queue, 15 J.

HUMAN RESOURCES

424 (1980).
92. David E. Bernstein, The Davis-Bacon Act. Vestige of Jim Crow, 13 NAT'L
BLACK L.J. (forthcoming 1994); David E. Bernstein, Roots of the Underclass: The Decline of Laissez-faire Jurisprudenceand the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U.
L. REV. 85 (1993).

the history of licensing legislation shows that it is an important part,
and one that should not be lightly dismissed by Epstein's critics.

